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In two separate actions brought under title forty-two, section
1983 of the United States Code,' plaintiffs, pregnant public school
teachers, challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory ma-
ternity leave rules of the Cleveland, Ohio, and Chesterfield
County, Virginia, school boards. The Cleveland rule required a
pregnant teacher to take unpaid maternity leave five months be-
fore the expected childbirth, with application for leave required at
least two weeks prior to departure. Eligibility to return was not
accorded until the next regular semester after the child was three
months old and, then, only with a doctor's certificate attesting to
the teacher's good health.
Chesterfield County's rule required that the pregnant teacher
stop work at least four months, and give notice at least six months,
prior to the expected childbirth. Re-employment was guaranteed
no later than the first day of the school year after the date she had
submitted a physician's written statement attesting to her physi-
cal fitness and had given assurances that the child would cause
minimal interferences with her duties as a teacher.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court' and found
that the Cleveland rule violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.' On the other hand, the Chesterfield
County rule ultimately was held constitutional by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,' which reversed the decision of the
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus.
tom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris.
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitutin and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2 LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973). A
divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, but
on rehearing en banc, a four-three decision reversed.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases.
Held, affirmed in part, reversed in part.' The manatory termina-
tion provisions of both maternity leave rules are unconstitutional
as violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The arbitrary cutoff dates set forth in the mandatory leave regula-
tions have no rational relationship to the state's interest in preserv-
ing continuity of instruction, keeping physically unfit teachers out
of the classroom, and protecting the health of mother and child.
Moreover, such regulations employ an irrebuttable presumption 7
that all pregnant teachers who reach the fifth or sixth month of
pregnancy are physically incapable of teaching. This presumption
unnecessarily restricts the exercise of protected constitutional
rights by penalizing a female teacher for deciding to bear children.
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
Unlike the lower courts who justified their holdings on the
basis of equal protection, Justice Stewart, in delivering the major-
ity opinion, found sufficient basis in the due process clause' to
dispose of the constitutional issues in this case. The Court com-
menced by recognizing freedom of choice in matters of marriage
and the family as a right protected by the due process clause.'
Quoting from Eisenstadt v. Baird," the majority defined this right
as the freedom "from unwarranted govermental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear. . . a child."" The majority saw the mandatory
maternity leave regulations as penalizing the pregnant teacher for
deciding to bear children, thereby forcing women to choose be-
tween the right to work and the fundamental right to bear chil-
dren."2
'Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd. 326 F' Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971).
'LaFleur was affirmed; Cohen was reversed and remanded. The Cleveland
return rule, with its three-months-age provision, was held unconstitutional. How-
ever, since the return provision of the Chesterfield County School Board rule served
legitimate state interests without employing unnecessary presumptions, that part
was held to be constitutional.
Once the basic fact is proved, the presumed fact is accepted as true regardless
of any evidence to the contrary. Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. Rzv. 1534 n.7 (1974).
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
I But see Note, supra note 7, at 1547.
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971).
" 414 U.S. at 640.
12 Id.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice
Douglas, criticized the emphasis on fundamental interests. He
agreed that these regulations do add to the burdens of childbearing
but rejected the majority's conclusion that the mandatory leave
regulations impair any right to bear children. First, the rules did
not directly affect the right to procreate but had only a "deterrent
impace. . . wholly incidental [to this right]."'" Second, even if
the infringement were direct, the rugulations could not be held
unconstitutional in view of Dandridge v. Williams," in which the
Court upheld the state's intentional effort to penalize childbear-
ing.15
Once the Court found that this fundamental right" was di-
rectly affected, due process attached to the interests at stake, af-
fording two basic protections:
(1)one cannot be deprived of constitutional liberties without
procedural safeguards such as notice and hearing, and (2) any
encroachment on the individual's rights must be justified by a
compelling state interest.'7
Since a fundamental right was affected, the question for the
Court was whether the interests promoted by the rules justified the
procedures that burdened the women's right to bear children. The
majority used a balancing test, weighing the interest of the preg-
nant teachers against the concerns of the school boards.
The boards of education offered two justifications for the man-
datory maternity leave rules-continuity of instruction and protect-
ing the health of the teacher and the unborn child. The Court
'1 Id. at 652 (Concurring opinion).
" 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
"In Dandridge, the Court upheld a Maryland maximum grant regulation
imposing a ceiling of $250 per month on Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) grants, regardless of the size of the family and its actual need. Since the
Maryland regulation would necessarily tend to discourage the bearing of children,
Justice Powell interprets Dandridge as a constitutional sanctioning of a state's
intentional effort to penalize childbearing. 414 U.S. at 651-52.
11 The following have been recognized as fundamental rights by the United
States Supreme Court: interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); free exercise of religion, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963); criminal procedure rights, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); educa-
tion, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); procreation, Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
17 61 Ky. L.J. 830, 833 (1973).
[Vol. 77
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recognized the advance notice provisions of the rules as wholly
rational and necessary to serve these objectives. However, the ab-
solute termination requirements were deemed to have no rational
relationship to the valid state interest of preserving continuity and
protecting the health of the teacher." The cutoff dates actually
promoted discontinuity by forcing pregnant teachers to leave at
some arbitrarily set date that might come, as it did in the plain-
tiffs' cases, only a few months before the end of a school term. The
Court noted that later cutoff dates would serve the boards' objec-
tives just as well and infringe less on this fundamental right.'9
Where the freedom affected was so valuable, a heavy burden
was placed on the school boards to prove that the means used
imposed the least burden on a woman's freedom to bear children.
The school boards argued that the mandatory leave provisions
were necessary to keep unfit teachers out of the classroom. The
Court responded that the rules created an irrebuttable presump-
tion that all pregnant teachers in their fifth or sixth month of
pregnancy are physically incapable of teaching."0 Such a presump-
tion is forbidden when it is "not necessarily or universally true in
fact" 1 and when the state has "alternative administrative means,
which do not so broadly infringe upon basic constitutional liberty,
in support of their legitimate goals." Although the presumption
served to promote the boards' objective to keep unfit teachers out
of the classroom, it swept too broadly by keeping out many teach-
ers who were fully capable of teaching. This presumption of physi-
cal incompetency not only persisted in the face of countervailing
medical evidence of a woman's physical health but also operated
to deny women a fair opportunity to rebut the presumption.
In a strong dissent, Justice Rehnquist, with whom Chief Jus-
tice Burger concurred, found the use of the words "irrebuttable
presumption" misleading.2 He emphasized that all general gov-
1 414 U.S. at 643.
19 Id.
2 Id at 644.
21 Id. at 644; accord, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
" 414 U.S. at 647.
2 Id. at 657-60 (dissenting opinion); accord, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 462
(1973) (dissenting opinion). In Vlandis, Chief Justice Burger spoke against the
Court's use of the irrebuttable presumption: "There will be, I fear, some ground
for a belief that the Court now engrafts the 'close judicial scrutiny' test onto the
Due Process Clause whenever we deal with something like 'permanent irrebuttable
presumptions.'"
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ernmental classifications are inherently unfair for someone and
inevitably draw lines that might prove arbitrary cases. The major-
ity opinion was not clear as to what judicial standard would deter-
mine when a classification reached the conclusive presumption
stage and when, in turn, such presumption would be unnecessary.
Justice Powell, recognizing the merits of this dissent, saw the
Court's return to the conclusive presumption aialysis as embark-
ing upon a road that has no foreseeable end. 4
The school boards argued more persuasively that the manda-
tory termination dates served the interests of administrative con-
venience. In view of the strong interest to protect the fundamental
right to bear children, however, the Court declared that mere ad-
ministrative convenience is insufficient to justify the presumption
of unfitness. It recognized that administrative efficiency is second-
ary to the purpose of the due process clause to protect the funda-
mental rights of a vulnerable citizenry from "the overbearing con-
cern for efficiency and efficacy."' '
Although presuming is more convenient than proving, the due
process clause requires that the means chosen must be those that
least infringe on a basic constitutional liberty. The majority sug-
gested the use of a more individualized determination would pro-
mote the school boards' objectives without infringing unduly on
the pregnant teacher's rights." Medical experts who testified in
these cases unanimously agreed that pregnancy is an individual
matter that should be dealt with as such. Medical examinations
by school board physicians or certification from the woman's ob-
stetrician could be means for determining the woman's physical
condition and the time at which she should discontinue work. Each
school board already relied upon similar procedures when evaluat-
ing the teacher's physical ability to return to work after childbirth.
Justice Powell viewed the majority's emphasis on individual
treatment as not only impractical but also at war with the need
for discretion in administrators to effectively discharge their du-
ties." And according to Justice Rehnquist, the Court's insistence
on individual determinations in this and other cases "is in the last
analysis nothing less than an attack upon the very notion of law-
21 414 U.S. at 652 (concurring opinion).
2 Id. at 646; accord, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
414 U.S. at 647 & n.13.
Id. at 656-57 (concurring opinion).
[Vol. 77
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making itself." It would call into question such commonly ac-
cepted laws as those requiring persons to be eighteen to vote or
twenty-one to buy liquor and civil service rules with mandatory
retirement ages.
2
The majority opinion did not preclude the use of line drawing.
Instead, it pointed out that any set terminations for purposes of
administrative convenience alone would not suffice under the due
process clause. Therefore, the Court did not strip the boards of
their latitude for dealing with problems presented by teacher preg-
nancies. It merely placed the burden of justification upon the
school boards to prove that more reasonable alternatives were not
available. The LaFleur holding reiterates the test set forth by Jus-
tice Marshall in United States Department of Agriculture v.
Murry:"
Where the private interests affected are very important and the
governmental interest can be promoted without much difficulty
by a well-designed hearing procedure, the Due Process Clause
requires the Government to act on an individualized basis, with
general propositions serving only as rebuttable presumptions or
other burden-shifting devices."
The constitutional problem with the rules, then, lies in the
early cutoff dates, not necessarily in the concept of a fixed termina-
tion date. This leaves open the question of where the line between
a permissible cutoff date and an overly restrictive one lies. The
majority offered no definite criteria for determining that line; how-
ever, it did set out several general considerations that might justify
an imposed termination date, for example, proof of widespread
medical concensus about the disabling effects of pregnancy on a
teacher's performance or evidence showing that such cutoff dates
were the only reasonable means of preventing labor in the
classroom." Other considerations might include the duties to be
performed and the place of work. For example, an early cutoff date
could be justified when the woman's work requires frequent expo-
sure to radiation or heavy lifting. Under these circumstances,
which are hazardous for the fetus, the purpose would be considered
sufficiently compelling to justify an early cutoff date."
Id. at 660 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 658-59 (Dissenting opinion).
413 U.S. 508 (1972).
" Id. at 518.
"414 U.S. at 647 n.13.
13 See Comment, Love's Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves,
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One of the most interesting aspects of LaFleur is the Court's
choice in analyzing the case on due process grounds and avoiding
the equal protection issue, that would directly involve the problem
of sex discrimination. The Court could have determined that the
boards' use of the conclusive presumption failed to recognize that
a disability on the part of any teacher, male or female, poses simi-
lar administrative problems. For example, men are subject to
crises of the body, such as prostatectomy, which, like pregnancy,
gives ample warning. This condition is dealt with under general
sick-leave requirements on an individual basis. Pregnancy alone is
dealt with under blanket presumptions based on the fallacious
idea that all pregnant women are unable to perform after the fifth
or sixth month. Therefore, the mandatory maternity leave rules
could have been declared unconstitutionsl as a denial of equal
protection.
Justice Powell saw the case as best analyzed in the framework
of equal protection," not due process. He perceived the constitu-
tional difficulty not in the boards' attempt to deal with the prob-
lem by classification but in their choice of irrational classifications
that were "invalid under rational-basis standards of equal protec-
tion review.""
The majority, although using the due process concept, appears
to rely largely on equal protection precedents." For example, by
focusing on the fundamental right to bear children, the majority
established grounds for using the strict scrutiny test37 of equal
protection analysis. Thus, the review entailed a much closer exam-
7 HAIv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. Lm. L. REv. 260, 269 (1972).
414 U.S. at 651 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 653 (concurring opinion).
The LaFleur decision has been called a strange hybrid between due process
and equal protection scrutiny. Note, supra note 7, at 1548.
17 Two standards of review have evolved to determine whether a classification
is constitutional. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. Rv. 1065 (1969). The strict scrutiny test or "active review" entails a much
closer examination and places a heavy burden of justification on the state. This test
requires that the state not only use the least onerous means to attain its objective
but also show some compelling interest for doing so. Id. at 1087-131. Active review
is used whenever a fundamental interest supra note 16, is affected or a suspect
classification such as race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), is invoked.
"Permissive" or "restrictive" review usually upholds a classification if it is reasona-
bly related to a legitimate purpose. Applying this test, the court will ask two
questions: (1) Was the purpose of the regulation valid? and (2) Does the classifica-
tion have a reasonable relation to that purpose? Id. at 1077-87.
[Vol. 77
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ination and placed a heavy burden of justification on the state.
The school boards were required not only to use the least onerous
means to attain their objectives but also to show some compelling
state interest for doing so.3"
LaFleur leaves unanswered several important questions con-
cerning maternity leave. Should pregnancy be treated as any other
temporary disability and, therefore, entitle the woman to disabil-
ity insurance, sick leave pay, and other fringe benefits? Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines answer
this question in the affirmative." However, recent lower court deci-
sions are split on this issue, Al the different results apparently turn-
ing on the courts' attitudes toward EEOC guidelines and their
differing concepts of the term disability. "
The Court expressed no opinion regarding the validity of ma-
ternity leave policies issued by EEOC and other federal agencies.42
3 The Court's unique approach to the due process concept indicates that it is
no longer so preoccupied with "the ghost of old due process." LaFleur, as did Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), seems to carry
the due process doctrine to "lengths few observers had expected." Tribe, The Su-
preme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1973). Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), merits additional consideration, especially his belief
that the Court "relies heavily on notions of substantive due process" and "harks
back to a day when the principles of Substantive Due Process had reached their
zenith in this Court." Id. at 463, 467.
" EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b)
(1972): "Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disa-
bilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. .. ."
11 Compare, e.g., Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga.
1973) (exclusion of pregnancy from sickness and disability benefit plan upheld),
with Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (exclusion
of pregnancy struck down).
41 The Newmon court rejected the EEOC guidelines and concluded that preg-
nancy is not a disability or sickness. Defining sickness in terms of being affected
with disease or not well or healthy, the court could not justify classifying pregnancy,
which is usually voluntary and evidence of a woman's normal health, as a disability.
On the other hand, the Wetzel court did give deference to EEOC guidelines and
defined pregnancy as a disability that, for medical reasons, prevents a person from
working. The court also observed that the disability plan was discriminatory in that
it singled out pregnancy, a disability limited to women, but did not single out
prostate troubles, a disability limited to men.
42 See, e.g., Crrzs AnviSORY CouNcL ON THE STATUs OF WoMEN, JOB-RELATED
MATERNrrY BENEFrrs 1 (1970); MANPOWER ADMUINsTRATON, DEP'T OF LABOR, UNE--
PLOYNM INC. PROORAl Lm Err No. 1097 (1971).
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Nevertheless, the Court previously has said that these guidelines
should be given "great deference." 3 It is very possible, therefore,
that the Court will uphold these guidelines and, in so doing, fur-
ther the cause of women's rights in general.
If the Supreme Court follows EEOC guidelines" and agrees
that pregnancy should be treated as any other disability, the result
could be that many other regulations will need to be revamped. For
example, many state unemployment plans have special provisions
that explicitly disqualify women unemployed due to pregnancy or
implicitly disqualify them under the presumption that pregnant
women are unable to, and are unavailable for, work or have volun-
tarily left work without good cause. In West Virginia an individual
is disqualified for benefits if she either voluntarily quit or was laid
off from employment because of pregnancy." If pregnancy is
treated as any other disability, this law appears to be invalid." The
validity of policies excluding pregnancy from personal leave cover-
age is also questionable. The West Virginia Board of Education,
for example, has stated that an absence from duty for pregnancy
is not covered by personal leave. 7
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
, The Court notes that the practical impact of its decision may have been
lessened by the subsequent Title VII amendments. 414 U.S. at 638-40 n.8. At the
time the cases arose, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1000c-
2000e-15 (1970), did not apply to state agencies and educational institutions.
Shortly after the amendments, the EEOC promulgated guidelines providing that
manatory maternity leave policies presumptively violate Title VII. The Court's
decision supports this EEOC guideline on sex discrimination. Since the Title VII
amendments fill the gaps left open by the prior exemptions of educational institu-
tions and state agencies, the Court will more than likely make any subsequent
decisions on the basis of Title VII, not on due process or equal protection.
' W.VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-6-3(7)(b) (1973 Replacement Volume. Under this
section a woman unemployed because of pregnancy is disqualified for benefits
until she returns to covered employment and has been employed therein
at least thirty working days; except that such disqualification shall last
no longer than six weeks prior to and six weeks subsequent to the date of
birth of the child, provided such individual furnishes to the department
certificates from a physician that she is physically able to work.
11 See generally Unemployment Benefits, 1 WOMEN'S RIoTs L. REP. No. 4, at
38 (1973).
11 W. Va. Board of Educ., Responses to Employee Questions (Dec. 10, 1971):
The personal leave law, " 18A-4-10, is a broad one, and seems to say that
a local board could allow personal leave for pregnancy or for "other cause
authorized or approved by the board." However, in the absence of a
policy allowing such usage, once an employee has assumed a leave of
absence for pregnancy, she is not eligible for that emolument of her posi-
tion until she returns to duty.
[Vol. 77
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Another major area that would be affected is insurance, in
which pregnancy is almost universally treated differently from
other disabilities. In a study conducted by the Pennsylvania Insur-
ance Commissioner, inadequate maternity coverage was found to
be one of the major areas of discrimination against women. 8 Ma-
ternity benefits are usually far below the average costs of preg-
nancy and childbirth, and female employees in group insurance
plans often receive smaller maternity benefits than wives of male
employees.49
Since the LaFleur opinion completely ignores any classifica-
tion of the case in terms of sex discrimination, it sheds no light on
the question of whether sex is a suspect classification requiring
strict scrutiny." Nevertheless, the Court's decision could be con-
sidered a major victory for women's rights advocates. 1 First, the
Court rejects the myths and stereotypes of pregnant women, espe-
cially in terms of their health and ability to remain on the job.
Cultural sex role conditioning has generated a certain stereotype
of the proper female response to pregnancy-a helpless, incapaci-
tated woman who is to be "protected" not only from work but from
the embarrassment that her condition may prompt and who, in
any case, is only working until she gets pregnant.2 As one court
stated, the fact that a woman does not fit neatly into this sterotype
"should not redound to her economic or professional detriment."53
Although some women are incapacitated by pregnancy, to say this
is true of all women defines much of our population in artificial,
stereotypical terms, that "are no less invidious than racial or reli-
gious ones." 4 Second, the Court discounts the outmoded moral
" See Sunday Gazette Mail, Feb. 10, 1974, at 4B, col. 1.
4' Id. at col. 5. See generally Love's Labors Lost, supra note 33.
5 Two recent Supreme Court decisions have invoked questions concerning
whether sex has been classified as "suspect," thereby requiring strict judicial scru-
tiny. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
An analysis of these two cases seems to place sex in the "near suspect" or, perhaps,
"suspiciously suspect" classification, thus requiring a test more stringent than
rational relation. See supra note 37, Professor Gunther suggests that the Court
imported "some special suspicion of sex-related means" into its analysis in Reed.
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1972).
' Washington Post, Jan.22, 1974, at Al, col. 5-6.
5 See Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
13Id. at 506n.1.
" Id. at 505.
10
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stigma attached to pregnancy,55 concluding with a reference to the
language in Green v. Waterford Board of Education: "Whatever
may have been the reaction in Queen Victoria's time, pregnancy
is no longer a dirty word."5
Because of the Court's decision, the woman worker no longer
should be required to choose between the right to work and the
right to bear children. Statistics show that forty-seven percent of
pregnant women work into their third trimester with no ill effects.57
An early forced maternity leave for these women could likely result
in grave financial burdens due to loss of wages and fringe benefits.
Many policies will have to be examined in light of the Court's
decision." Since the Cleveland and Chesterfield County rules are
"typical of a national pattern, "" maternity leave policies of school
Interesting to note is the study by anthropologist Ashley Montaque in regard
to other societies' responses to woman's pregnancy. For example, in some nonliter-
ate societies many women take less than four or five days after childbirth to return
to normal chores. In cultures such as the bushmen of South Africa and the Austra-
lian aborigines, a woman's pregnancy or recent childbirth is no reason for deviation
from the normal manner of living, except for the additional task of nursing. A.
MONTAQUE, THE NATURAL SUPEruORITY OF WOMEN 16-17 (rev. ed. 1970). See generally
WomN's BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT STDs. ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, TH MYTH AND THE
REALIrY (1972).
414 U.S. at 641n.9.
473 F.2d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 1973).
22 DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, No.
7, EMPLOYMENT DUPING PREGNANCY-1963, at 2 (1968). The percentage of women
employed during pregnancy increases as the woman's educational level increases.
Eighty-two percent of women with college degrees were employed during preg-
nancy.
U In 1971 thirty-eight percent of the United States work force were women.
Fifty-eight percent of those were married, twenty-three percent single, nineteen
percent widowed, divorced, or separated. WOMEN's BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT STDs.
ADMIN., DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN Ta LABOR FORCE 1-2 (1972).
Approximately sixty-five percent of all working women, whom mandatory ma-
ternity leaves would affect, would have, at most, only seven thousand dollars sup-
plemental income.
11 See, e.g., 16 EDUCATION U.S.A. No.22 (1974), where the decision is said to
have possible implications in other areas of teachers' rights, such as rules against
blind or overweight teachers.
61 Washington Post, Jan 22, 1974, at 4A, col.1.
On Nov. 12, 1971, the West Virginia Board of Education adopted a new ma-
ternity leave policy that allows voluntary maternity leave for a period of one year
and requires mandatory leave when "in the opinion of the employee's attending
physician, she is unable to continue her duties." W. Va. Bd. of Educ., Maternity
Leave Policy for School Employees (Nov. 12, 1971). This replaced a 1942 policy that
required at least four months pre-birth and seven weeks post-birth leave; refusal
[Vol. 77
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boards must be reviewed. In additon, maternity leave policies in
union contracts must also be scrutinized.
6'
As Justice Rehnquist forewarned, there is a possibility that
the ratio decidendi of the decision may have far reaching effects
on many other regulations that draw lines on the basis of broad
classifications. Yet, the LaFleur decision will wield the most signif-
icant impact in the area of women's rights. In this era of women's
liberation and the Equal Rights Amendment, this decision is a
positive indication of the Court's willingness, in similar cases
brought under Title VII, to eliminate unfair maternity leave prac-
tices based on stereotype classifications that sweep too broadly.
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